We present a powerful authorization mechanism which supports: (1) 
Introduction
In many application domains, the need of restricting access permissions to specific time intervals or periods arises naturally. Authorizations often need to be tailored to the pattern of users' activities; as an example, consider part-time staff that should be authorized for accesses only on working days between 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. Temporal authorizations are also crucial for optimizing resource usage. For instance, execution of resource-expensive programs might be restricted to specific time periods.
Another crucial requirement is the possibility of expressing the relationships that usually exist among authorization subjects and objects. In most application domains, subjects and objects are hierarchically organized. The semantics of these hierarchies depends on the considered domain. For instance, the object hierarchy usually defines the composition of an object in terms of other objects (e.g., a directory immediately precedes in the hierarchy the files it contains), whereas the subject hierarchy usually reflects the relative position of subjects within the organization.
In this paper, we present an authorization model that provides integrated support for all the aforementioned features. In the model, temporal authorizations can be specified: positive authorizations, for granting a privilege; negative authorizations, for explicitly denying a privilege. A temporal authorization is an authorization that holds for specific periods of time. Subjects and objects are organized into hierarchies, supporting a more adequate representation of their semantics. Authorizations automatically propagate along these hierarchies in that a subject may inherit authorizations specified for more general subjects and objects, unless different specific authorizations are explicitly provided. Through inheritance, many protection requirements can be expressed concisely. For instance, a user may authorize all the employees to access the files of a given directory with only one authorization, having as subject the class "employee" and as object the directory. Such an authorization automatically propagates to all the employees and all the files in the directory. Furthermore, owners can always specify positive and negative exceptions to such general authorizations, by issuing authorizations at the lowest levels in the hierarchies. Thus, the resulting model provides a high degree of flexibility coupled with the possibility of enforcing stricter controls on crucial data items.
Our model supports also temporal derivation rules, by which many protection requirements can be concisely and clearly specified. For example, it is possible to state that two users, working on the same project, must receive the same authorizations on certain types of objects, or that a user can access an object in certain periods, provided that nobody else is allowed to access the same object in the same periods.
The work reported in this paper is based on the model presented in [?] , that supports both temporal authorizations and derivation rules. The current paper extends [?] with the possibility of hierarchically organizing authorization subjects and objects, and with the related inheritance mechanism. This extension is particularly important when dealing with the interoperability of heterogeneous, distributed systems. In this framework, different local security policies have to be represented and integrated at a global level, to guarantee interoperability and to detect possible inconsistencies and security breaches [?] . Such global representation and integration involves (among other issues) establishing mappings among different object types and subjects. Such mappings, as when dealing with integration of heterogeneous data models, require the notion of hierarchy for both the object types and the subject types. We have therefore extended our previous model with hierarchies in view of supporting temporal authorizations in heterogeneous, distributed systems.
The introduction of hierarchies for authorization objects and subjects raises several theoretical and performance issues. When inheritance and authorization rules are used simultaneously, subtle ambiguities may easily arise, even in very simple specifications. Clearly, it would be hard to detect such ambiguities in specifications of realistic size, without the help of some automated tool. This task is further complicated by the fact that authorizations can be independently formulated by different users, and, generally, they are not aware of every single authorization and rule in the system. The standard solution to this problem (adopted in [?] ) consists in requiring the rules to satisfy so-called stratifiability conditions. Unfortunately, stratifiability does not solve the problem; in Example ?? above, rules R 1 and R 2 can be encoded in a specification which is stratified, according to [?] . Technically speaking, the problem is that inheritance introduces "hidden rules" that make authorization bases always equivalent to non-stratified logic programs [?] . Such programs, in general, may be ambiguous (in the above sense) or inconsistent. Moreover no general, efficient way of computing their models is known (the problem is NP-hard). Thus, dealing simultaneously with rules and inheritance requires the development of new techniques.
For this purpose, in this paper, we introduce a notion of safeness, and prove that it guarantees the absence of ambiguities and inconsistencies in the specification. Moreover, we define an efficient algorithm for computing authorizations from safe specifications, by dynamically refining a sort of stratification during the computation.
The introduction of temporal features in access control on one side, and the use of logical formalisms for specifying authorizations, on the other side, have been addressed by other research efforts. In particular, the Kerberos [?] system provides a notion of ticket, with an associated validity time. The purpose of temporal tickets is very different from our access control model. The former record only the fact that a client has been authenticated by the authentication server; they cannot be used to grant access to specific documents or resources managed by the server.
From the side of logical formalisms for security specifications, Woo and Lam in [?] propose a very general formalism for expressing authorization rules. Their language does not support temporal constraints explicitly, but it has almost the same expressive power as first order logic; this makes it possible to model temporal constraints. The main drawback is that the trade-off between expressiveness and efficiency seems to be strongly unbalanced in their approach. Jajodia et al. in [?] propose a logic language for expressing authorization rules. Their language can express most of the policies definable through the access control mechanisms proposed so far in the literature; however, temporal authorizations cannot be expressed. The development of flexible authorization models has been addressed in other papers [?, ?] . However none of these proposals support a complete set of features as our model, nor they provide a formal foundation to their models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section ?? introduces the formalism we use to represent periodic time. Section ?? illustrates the basic components of the authorization model. Section ?? gives their formal semantic. Section ?? introduces the notion of safe authorization base and gives a mechanism to check whether an authorization base satisfies this condition. Section ?? concludes the paper and outlines future work.
Periodic Expressions
A symbolic (user friendly) formalism to represent periodic time is provided. The formalism consists of a pair h[begin,end], Pi where P is a periodic expression denoting an infinite set of time intervals, and [begin,end] denotes the lower and upper bounds that are imposed on time intervals in P.
The formalism for periodic expressions is essentially the one proposed in [?], based on the notion of calendars. A calendar is defined as a countable set of contiguous intervals, 1 numbered by integers called index of the intervals.
A subcalendar relationship can be established between calendars. Given two calendars C 1 and C 2 , we say that C 1 is a subcalendar of C 2 , (written omitted when its value is all, whereas it is represented by its unique element when it is a singleton. r:C d is omitted when it is equal to 1:C n .
The infinite set of time intervals corresponding to a periodic expression P is denoted by (P). Function () is formally defined as follows. For simplicity, in this paper the bounds begin and end will be denoted by date expressions of the form mm/dd/yy:hh, with the obvious intended meaning; end can also be 1. 
The Hierarchical Temporal Authorization Model (HTAM)
In this section we illustrate the basic components of our hierarchical temporal authorization model (HTAM for short).
In the following, S denotes the set of subjects, O is the set of objects, and M is the set of access modes. Members of S are the identifiers with which users connect to the system. We suppose identifiers may refer to single users (e.g., Ann or Bob) or roles (e.g., staff or manager). Subjects and objects are structured into hierarchies. Figure ? ? shows an example of subject and object hierarchies.
HTAM supports positive and negative temporal authorizations with the following structure. 
We assume that conflicting temporal authorizations may be simultaneously specified. This is a natural assumption both in discretionary frameworks (where different grantors may concurrently grant authorizations on the same objects) and in federated databases (where independently developed local security policies need to be merged to obtain secure interoperation). Conflicts are dealt with according to the denials-takeprecedence principle [?] , unless one of the conflicting authorizations is more specific than the others with respect to the specified hierarchies. In that case, less specific authorizations are overridden. 
Definition 3.3 [?] A temporal authorization base (TAB) is a set of temporal authorizations and derivation rules.
Roughly speaking, rule ([begin,end], P, A op F) states that for each instant in Sol([begin,end], P), A can be derived provided that F is valid at the same instant, or in a certain set of past instants (depending on op). The grantor of A should be the user who specifies the rule.
The following is an intuitive account of the semantics of derivation rules. It will be assumed that all authorizations are granted by the same subject; therefore, the grantor will not be considered in the discussion. Figure ? ? states that tech-staff can write papers each Monday and Friday starting from the first in 1998 in which both managers and admin-staff are not authorized to read papers. Figure ? ? and the subject and object hierarchies in Figure ? ?. The following authorizations can be derived: 
Example 3.3 Consider the TAB in

Formal Semantics of TABs
We start by introducing some notation. The hierarchies of subjects and objects are Access control is based on the set of time-stamped authorizationsthat can be derived from the given TAB T. A time-stamped authorization is a pair (t A) where t is a nonnegative integer (a "tick" in the basic calendar) and A 2 A (the intuitive meaning is "A holds at time t").
Formalizing derivability involves delicate technicalities due to the presence of negation as failure. Rules such as R = ( t t] ? A whenever :B ; ) are triggered only if (t B ; ) is not derivable, and (t A) should be inherited only if (t A) is not derivable (according to the overriding mechanism outlined in the previous section). Consequently, derivable authorizations cannot be defined incrementally through a classical inductive definition; for example, the above rule R may be applicable at a certain stage of the derivation process, but as deduction goes on, (t B ; ) might become derivable, thereby invalidating the conclusion of R. Informally speaking, in order to decide whether R can be applied we should guess whether (t B ; ) will ever be derived in the future. Fortunately, a similar form of negation has already been formalized in logic programming, through the stable model semantics [?]; here we adopt the same idea.
Intuitively, the definition of derivable authorizations models the following three steps: 3 (i) First, the set of all derivable time-stamped authorizations, I, is guessed; (ii) the consequences of the given TAB T are derived incrementally, by recursively applying all the applicable rules of T and inheritance; the applicability of inheritance and rules with negative literals in the body-like R-is checked using I to "guess the future"; (iii) clearly, the initial guess is correct if it coincides with what can be actually derived with the given rules, i.e. if I equals the set of authorizations derived in step (ii).
Then, the formal definition corresponding to the above steps is just a fixpoint equation I = I T " !, where I is the initial guess and I T " ! is the set of authorizations obtained in step (ii). In particular, I T models a single application (in parallel) of all the applicable rules of T, 4 and the operator " ! iterates I T . 5 To formalize I T in a compact way, we introduce a notion of validity relative to the initial guess I. Recall from the previous section that conflicting authorizations 3 The efficient algorithms introduced in the next section apply only to safe TABs and do not match the generate-and-test nature of the following steps. 4 Note that this operator depends on I , as required by step (ii).
may be simultaneously derivable from T ; in this case the denials-take-precedence principle is applied; validity captures this idea, and it can be extended to arbitrary boolean combinations of authorizations in negation normal form (NNF). 6 Intuitively, in the following, J stands for the set of authorizations that have been derived at some intermediate step of the derivation (I is the initial guess). is the result of one more derivation step. The first four sets in the right-hand side formalize the semantics of TAB rules; the last set defines the semantics of inheritance. The precedence of negative authorizations over positive authorizations is obtained by inheriting A + only when no conflicting authorization B 2 Con icts(A + ) can possibly be inherited; in turn, this is verified by checking that no parent A 3 of B is valid.
As we have already pointed out, by iterating the above operator we obtain all the facts derivable from T , given the initial guess I. 6 A formula is in negation normal form if negation is applied only to atoms. This is the form of the bodies of TAB rules. 
Dynamically Stratified TABs
A TAB may have multiple v-stable models, or no v-stable models at all. In this section, we introduce conditions that guarantee that the TAB has exactly one v-stable model (and hence a consistent, non ambiguous semantics).
A labeled dependency graph is a graph whose nodes are authorizations from A and whose edges are labeled with +, ; or v (accordingly, the edges are called positive, negative or variable).
Let DG T (t) be the labeled dependency graph whose set of nodes is A and whose edges are all and only the triples h A l B i that satisfy some of the following conditions:
(DG1) For some rule (T I P Bh op i F) 2 T such that t 2 Sol(T I P ) , TABs will be required to satisfy the following safeness conditions. We shall prove that safeness guarantees the existence of a unique stable model. A stratification of a set of authorizations A 0 A is a mapping : A 0 ! f 1 : : : jA 0 j g . We say that is compatible with a labeled dependency graph DG if: 1) for all edges h A l B i in DG, (A) (B) , and 2) if l = ; then (A) < (B) .
In the standard logic programming setting, the existence of a compatible stratification is equivalent to the "safeness" of the program. On the contrary, here safeness is stronger (the second condition is not enforced by the existence of a stratification).
Intuitively, the problem is that for every conflicting pair A B , the inheritability of A depends on the absence of B and viceversa. Fortunately, this cyclic (non-stratifiable) dependency does not affect the nice properties of stratifiable programs (i.e., the existence of a unique stable model which can be computed in polynomial time). and where t l is a refined stratification of A t l w.r.t. M (t l 1);1 . Roughly speaking, T (t l i) is the set of rules and authorizations that can possibly be used to derive timestamped authorizations whose layer is (t l i). Note that T (t l i) depends on M (t l 1);1 through t l . First, it must be shown that the above construction is well defined, by proving that pre-stratifications t and refined stratifications t l exist. Definition ?? above gives a method to test whether a given TAB satisfies the safeness conditions. Such test is performed by checking a set of conditions, for each instant t 0. Obviously, this test is feasible in practice only if we can safely stop it at some finite instant t. The particular form our rules allows us to ensure the existence of this finite constant, denoted in the following as max-time. max-time is determined as t max + k P max , where t max is the greater instant corresponding to an end date expression in TAB, P max is the least common multiple of all the periodicities of the periodic expressions appearing in TAB, and k is the maximum number of aslongas and upon rules in TAB plus one. The important property is that, after instant max-time, the validity of any authorization in TAB becomes periodic. The proof of the existence of max-time, adapted from [?], is contained in [?] .
Two different strategies can be used to enforce access control: run-time derivation and materialization. Under the latter approach, the system permanently maintains all the valid authorizations derivable from a TAB. Access control therefore becomes very efficient; as a drawback, the materialization has to be properly updated every time the TAB is modified. A detailed discussion of access control under the materialization approach is presented in [?].
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a powerful authorization mechanism which provides support for temporal authorizations, user-defined derivation rules, and the hierarchical organization of subjects and objects.
We have given a solution to the problems related to the simultaneous presence of inheritance and authorization rules. Variable edges, safeness and the dynamic stratification mechanism have no counterpart in the literature. Safeness guarantees that the TAB is consistent and unambiguous.
Sometimes, in the presence of ambiguities, it may be possible to select one stable model of the TAB, by taking into account additional information, such as the grantors of the conflicting authorizations, or priorities defined over access modes. This will be the subject of future work.
